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SOCIAL GROUP, AND MORAL ORIENTATION FACTORS AS MEDIATORS 
OF RELIGIOSITY AND MULTIPLE ATTITUDE TARGETS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although there is a tradition of examining generalised discrimination against multiple targets, 
recent studies have tended to consider race and homosexuality as separate targets without 
considering their relationship to each other. Recent studies have also argued for a moral 
dimension in attitudes to homosexuality, but this has not yet been explicitly modelled as an 
explanation for patterns of social attitudes. In a questionnaire study of practicing Christians 
(N=143) we examined the relationship of religious orientation and ideology (intrinsic, 
extrinsic, fundamentalism, orthodoxy, quest) with four attitude targets (Aboriginal 
Australians, women, homosexual persons, and abortion).  Using SEM, we develop a two-
factor model, incorporating group and moral orientation factors, which completely mediates 
the relationships between the religiosity variables and the social attitudes. Religiosity 
variables exhibit different patterns of correlation with the two factors. The two-factor model 
provides a useful framework for further exploration of socially and politically contested 
attitudes. 
 
KEYWORDS: Religious Orientation, Fundamentalism, Attitude to Homosexuality, Social 
Attitudes 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a long tradition of exploring the association that religious belief and practice have 
with a variety of social issues.  This question continues to be very relevant in the light of 
recent public debate, in the USA, Australia, and elsewhere regarding such issues as abortion 
and gay marriage (e.g., Badgett 2004; Bidstrup 2004; Djupe, Olson, and Gilbert 2006; Ehrich 
2006; Naylor 2006; Rosik 2006), as well as ongoing interest in the social impact of racial 
attitudes.  Within the social science of religion it has long been assumed that correlations 
among various social prejudices point to individual differences as the main explanation for 
prejudiced attitudes (e.g., Allport 1954; Allport and Ross 1967; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 
1992; Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989).  However, a number of researchers have also 
pointed to differences in the patterns of attitudes toward diverse targets as indications of 
social-level normative processes at work by showing target specificity, and change over time 
as the social and political context changes (e.g., Allport 1954; Herek 1987; Gorsuch 1988; 
Louis, Mavor, and Terry 2003; Pettigrew 1958; Reynolds et al. 2001).  A better understanding 
of both similarities and differences in the patterns of social attitudes is needed to examine the 
role of these complementary processes.   
Research on the impact of religiosity on prejudice has been heavily based on the intrinsic-
extrinsic religious orientation distinction (Allport and Ross 1967; Gorsuch and McPherson 
1989), the quest orientation (Batson and Schoenrade 1991, 1991; Batson and Ventis 1982; 
Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993), fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; 
Herek 1987; McFarland 1989), and orthodoxy (e.g., Hunsberger 1989; Kirkpatrick 1993; 
Laythe et al. 2002).  The relationships among these scales and their relationships with social 
attitudes remain an important domain of research, and although there has been a recent trend 
away from the use of the intrinsic-extrinsic orientation dimensions due to various 
methodological and conceptual problems (Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990, 1991; Masters 1991), 
it is not yet clear that alternative conceptualisations and measurement have emerged.  If 
nothing else, the intrinsic scale remains a measure of religious commitment that provides 
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continuity with a large existing literature (Gorsuch and McFarland 1972; Gorsuch and 
McPherson 1989; Donahue 1985; Duck and Hunsberger 1999). 
Early reviews of the intrinsic-extrinsic orientation literature supported Allport’s contention 
(1950; 1966; Allport and Ross 1967) that extrinsic religion is associated with prejudice but 
found that intrinsic religion, rather than being associated with avoidance of prejudice, had 
only a small negative association with prejudice, or no association with prejudice (Donahue 
1985; Gorsuch and Aleshire 1974). By contrast, more ideological, belief-content measures, 
such as quest, fundamentalism and orthodoxy have been found to be highly predictive of a 
range of attitudes including racial attitudes, attitudes to women, gay men and lesbians, and 
communists (Herek 1987; Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989).  This general pattern has also 
been found with implicit measures of attitudes to race, Christians and Moslems, and 
homosexuality (Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Rowatt, Franklin, and Cotton 2005; Rowatt et al. 
2006), though the strength of the relationships are generally much weaker with implicit 
measures. 
Interestingly, different patterns have been found for racial attitudes and attitudes to gay men 
and lesbians that suggest that orientations and ideological measures act differently on 
different types of attitude.  Herek (1987) found that the extrinsic scale was significantly 
related to anti-black prejudice as well as anti-homosexual prejudice.  The intrinsic scale was 
related to anti-homosexual prejudice, but was unrelated to anti-black prejudice.  Herek argued 
that this latter result is due to the ideological position that Christians are intrinsically 
committed to; that anti-black prejudice is seen as inappropriate, but that anti-homosexual 
prejudice is still consistent with Christian commitment. An interesting qualification of these 
results is the fact that when Herek entered the intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation scales 
into a hierarchical regression analysis controlling for religious ideology (i.e., 
fundamentalism), neither of the scales predicted prejudice over and above fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalist belief largely subsumed the associations of the intrinsic and extrinsic scales 
with prejudice against gay men and lesbians.  This finding further supported Herek's 
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argument that religious prejudice is ideology specific, rather than associated with an 
underlying religious personality. 
McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick (1993) explored this pattern further by extending the range 
of attitude targets to include attitudes toward women and communists as well as anti-black 
and anti-homosexual attitudes.  They used a composite of these four attitudes to construct a 
general tendency to discriminate factor.  The fundamentalism measures correlated positively 
with the general tendency to discriminate factor as well as the individual attitudes, indicating 
more negative views to all four groups.  The quest scale generally showed the mirror image 
effect, with positive views toward all the groups.  The intrinsic scale showed positive 
correlations with discrimination against homosexual persons and communists, but neutral or 
negative associations with discrimination against blacks and women. 
Taken together, these studies suggest two central findings: that the intrinsic measure may be 
associated with negative attitudes toward socially legitimate targets such as homosexual 
people and communists, but relatively positive, or at least neutral, attitudes toward proscribed 
targets such as women and Blacks (Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Duck and 
Hunsberger 1999); and that fundamentalism is associated with negative views to all these 
groups (Herek 1987; Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989).  With regard to these targets, the 
quest scale (when it was included) tended to follow the opposite pattern to fundamentalism, 
and Christian orthodoxy (when included) tended to show the same pattern as fundamentalism, 
but more weakly, so these results can be seen as minor variations on the two main patterns. 
These patterns require clarification in two main ways.  One possible approach is to seek to 
explore the nature of the overlapping relationships between intrinsic religious orientation, 
fundamentalism, quest, and orthodoxy, and to include other variables that might help to 
clarify these relationships (such as right-wing authoritarianism; (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996; 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).  McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick (1993) followed Herek 
(1987) in examining the patterns after partialling out fundamentalism, and several authors 
have taken this further through multiple regression (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe 
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et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Wylie and Forest 1992).  In the majority of 
these studies that have focused on the partial effects of the predictors, only two attitude 
targets have been used; attitudes to blacks (or more broadly cross-racial attitudes), and 
attitudes to homosexual persons, as these are seen to be representative of these two types of 
target (proscribed and legitimate; Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993).  
The alternative approach, which we have pursued in this study, is to explore further the 
relationships among the attitude targets themselves.  Recent regression studies (Laythe et al. 
2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001) have analysed the effects of predictors on racial 
attitudes and homosexual persons separately in spite of the fact that these criterion variables 
are substantially correlated, leaving some ambiguity in the interpretation.  Further work on 
the structure of the underlying criterion attitudes would, therefore, be a worthwhile and 
complementary contribution to this domain.  With only two targets, however, it is not 
possible to explore both similarities and differences, and so we took an approach more akin to 
that followed by McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick (1993), incorporating multiple attitude 
targets.   
In focusing our attention on the attitudes targets, we have limited our predictors to direct 
measures of religious orientation or ideology, and therefore there are two notable omissions; 
RWA and social desirability.  RWA has become a common inclusion in recent studies of 
religiosity and prejudice because it seems to be a very good predictor, particularly of racial 
attitudes and homosexuality (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 2002; 
Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001). However, RWA is problematic in this context, mainly 
because it already incorporates items pertaining to homosexuality (see Whitley and Lee 
2000), and fundamentalism within the conventionalism component of the construct.  This 
causes both empirical and conceptual problems for a study specifically investigating the 
relationships between these separate constructs.   
Social conventions can impact on social attitudes in two broadly conceptualised ways; a 
person developing attitudes that are congruent with the norms of socially important groups 
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(including society at large), or a tendency toward compliance with social conventions, 
measured as a personality trait (social desirability).  The former kind of social influence is 
central to this study, through the idea that the response to attitude targets is ideology specific 
and that some targets are considered legitimate or not.  Although there is some evidence that 
social desirability, in the personality sense, does correlate with intrinsic religiosity, there has 
been little evidence that it actually mediates the relationship with prejudice.  Gorsuch (1988) 
argues strongly against social desirability, in this sense, as a useful explanatory mechanism, 
pointing to larger scale social change factors as much more important.  Given limited space in 
the questionnaire, and the concerns we have raised above, we decided to exclude both RWA 
and social desirability measures to focus instead on the underlying structure of the attitude 
targets. 
An important advantage of the McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick (1993) studies was that 
they explicitly modelled the idea of an underlying construct of general discrimination, and 
then considered the effect of the religiosity variables on this general factor as well as on the 
individual targets.  In doing so, they effectively explored the extent to which the general 
discrimination factor mediated the relationships between the religiosity variables and the 
attitude variables.  However, in both cases, the modelling process was restricted to the use of 
first- and second-order partial correlation analysis.  Structural equation modelling (SEM) has 
several advantages over partial correlation analysis in developing this approach further: 
formal tests of the fit of alternative models are available; multiple latent variables can be 
modelled explicitly; and patterns of residual correlations can be explicitly assumed to be zero, 
removing the need to interpret large tables of small residuals that may not be meaningful.  So 
one of our goals for this study was to follow the approach of McFarland and Kirkpatrick, but 
to model the data more explicitly with SEM. 
A recent example of this method in action (Cunningham, Nezlek, and Banaji 2004) explored 
the higher-level structure of attitudes falling under the umbrella of ethnocentrism. They found 
support for a common factor structure underlying attitudes to various disadvantaged groups 
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(Jews, the poor, foreigners, homosexual people) measured explicitly, and implicitly using the 
IAT. The explicit and implicit measures fell on different factors, but the factors represented 
parallel groupings of the same targets. This suggests that the difference in these factors relates 
to the method of measurement, but that the underlying structure of implicit and explicit 
measures may be similar.  
We followed McFarland (1989), Kirkpatrick (1993) and Cunningham et al., (2004) in 
modelling a common factor underlying the attitudes toward several social groups.  However, 
subsequent studies have suggested a particular explanation for the differences between the 
attitudes toward groups like blacks and women relative to attitudes to gay men and lesbians; 
namely that the latter have a moral component not attached to the other attitudes.  Researchers 
have distinguished several possible dimensions of attitudes toward homosexual people, but 
two dimensions are consistently included; attitudes toward gay men and lesbians as a 
minority group (also called a civil rights dimension), and a moral dimension (Fulton, 
Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Gorsuch 1993; Green 2005; Kite and Whitley 1996; LaMar and 
Kite 1998; Veenvliet and Hunsberger 2003; Wilkinson 2004). Although conceptually distinct, 
these dimensions tend to be highly correlated and hard to distinguish empirically, leading 
some researchers to argue that attitudes to homosexuality operates as a single dimension (e.g., 
Herek 1984).  While it may be difficult to distinguish these dimensions within a single 
attitude domain, it may be possible to identify a moral dimension as a higher-order cluster of 
attitudes to behaviors subject to moral judgement, in the same sense that attitudes toward 
various minority groups share something in common. 
It is possible that, given the similar pattern of responses for attitudes to homosexual persons 
and communists, that attitudes toward communists might also have had two components: 
attitudes to communists as a group, and attitudes to the morality of communism itself.  In 
combination with attitudes to homosexuality it is possible, that a second latent variable could 
be modelled based on the four groups included in the McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick 
(1993) studies.  However, there are two good reasons for replacing the attitudes to 
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communists component in the model. First, the current political climate does not support the 
inclusion of communists as a meaningful target of discriminatory attitudes.  More 
importantly, a clear indicator of the moral dimension of judgement is preferable to two 
compound indicators. We considered attitude to the morality of abortion to be an appropriate 
addition, being an issue of ongoing public moral debate.  In addition to this change, given that 
the study was conducted in Australia, the appropriate racial minority of political significance 
is Aboriginal Australians.  Thus, the four target attitudes in this study were attitudes to 
Aboriginal Australians, women, gay men and lesbians, and abortion. 
On the basis of previous findings and arguments, we based our main expectations on the 
conceptual distinction between proscribed and legitimate attitude targets, with the latter being 
framed in terms of moral choices, particularly with respect to religious beliefs.  We expected 
that we would find that attitudes to Aboriginal Australians, women, and gay men and lesbians 
would form a factor representing symbolic attitudes to minority or low-status groups. 
Considered in isolation, this factor would not completely mediate the relationship between 
religiosity variables and social targets, but would require different patterns of residual 
relationships for attitudes to Aboriginal Australians and women versus attitudes to gay men 
and lesbians, reflecting the possibility of an additional moral component to attitudes to gay 
men and lesbians.  Further, we expected that when attitudes to abortion were included a 
second factor would emerge, indicated by attitudes to homosexual persons and attitudes to 
abortion.  To the extent that the residual relationships between religiosity variables and 
attitudes to homosexual persons are framed as a moral issue, we expect that this second factor 
would account for them, such that a two-factor model would completely mediate the 
relationship between religiosity variables and all the target attitudes. 
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METHOD 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 163 members of a mainstream Christian denomination in Australia took part in the 
study.  They were church members, surveyed in youth group or congregational settings from 
a variety of city, regional and rural locations and young adults surveyed at a denominational 
young adult camp.  Data from twenty respondents were unusable because they did not 
complete all the central measures used in this study, leaving 143 participants (82 Female, 58 
Male).  The sample included 96 participants from youth and young adult groups with an 
average age of 20.8; and 47 general congregation members with an average age of 53.4.   
Materials 
The scales used in this analysis were part of a larger questionnaire constructed in cooperation 
with church officials investigating aspects of the experience of youth and young adults in the 
church.  We were able to include an “attitudes to social issues” instrument containing 
measures of attitudes to homosexuality, Aboriginal Australians, women, and abortion, as well 
as a “religious belief” instrument containing measures of religious orientation, 
fundamentalism, quest, and orthodoxy. 
Attitude Measures 
The measure of attitudes to homosexuality was a 10-item scale. Five items were drawn from 
Herek’s (1987) ATLG scale (e.g., “If a man has homosexual feelings, he should do 
everything he can to overcome them.”). Three of these items referred to gay men and two 
referred to lesbians.  An additional five items were selected from the modern homonegativity 
scale (Cox 1998), based on the modern racism scale (McConahay, Hardee, and Batts 1981).  
An example item was “Homosexuals should not push themselves where they are not wanted.”  
All of the homonegativity items referred to “homosexuals” or “homosexual persons” as the 
attitude target. 
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Attitudes toward Aboriginal Australians were measured with a 6-item scale modified from the 
modern racism scale.  An example item was “Aboriginal Australians are getting too 
demanding in their push for equal rights.”  Attitudes to women were measured with 11 items 
(e.g., “It is as important for a man to help advance his wife's career as it is for a woman to 
advance her husband's.”). Two items measuring symbolic attitudes to abortion were also 
included in this study (e.g., “Abortion is a personal moral choice for a women, not a decision 
society should make on her behalf.”).   
Religiosity Measures 
The orthodoxy measure consisted of 5 items from the short form of the Christian orthodoxy 
scale (Hunsberger 1989).  An example item was “I believe one must accept Jesus Christ as 
Lord and Saviour to be saved from sin”. The Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) version of the 
religious orientation scale included 14 items measuring intrinsic orientation (e.g., “I try hard 
to live all my life according to my religious beliefs”), extrinsic-personal orientation (e.g., “I 
pray mainly to gain relief and protection”) and  extrinsic-social orientation (e.g., “I go to 
church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there”).   
There have been several versions of the quest and fundamentalism scales in use in previous 
relevant research.  In the case of quest, different versions of the scale were used by 
McFarland (1989), Batson and Shoenrade (1991) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992), but 
the latter version incorporates many of the items from the other scales.  Therefore, for the 
current study, quest was measured with 11 items from Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) that 
are also representative of other versions.  An example item was “Religious doubt allows us to 
learn”.   
In the case of fundamentalism, several distinctive versions exist.  Recent studies (e.g., Laythe 
et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001) have made use of the Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger (1992) scale that emphasises specific belief content, for example, “God has given 
mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally 
followed”.  McFarland (1989) used a different set of items that incorporates an element of 
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concern for the boundaries of acceptable belief, (e.g., “It is very important for true Christians 
to believe that the bible is the infallible word of God”), and these items were also used by 
Kirkpatrick (1993).  Both of these approaches have been suggested as important elements of 
the fundamentalism construct (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991), and so both measures were 
included in the study for comparison purposes.  Therefore, fundamentalism was measured 
using both the 6-item scale from McFarland (1989) and 13 items taken from Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger (1992).  In all of the scales used in this study, participants responded on a 6-point 
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Preliminary Analyses 
A total of 143 respondents completed the relevant sections of the questionnaire.  To ensure 
sufficiently reliable scale scores allowing for missing data on some items, a scale score was 
computed if a participant responded to at least 75% of the items for any given scale.  For 
scales with three or fewer items, all items had to be completed.  By this criterion, 127 
participants had usable responses for all scales.  The remaining 16 participants were missing a 
maximum of two scale values from the complete set needed for the analyses below.  Given 
the restricted sample size, it was decided to include these participants in the following 
analyses and use the pair-wise method for computing correlations, keeping a total useable 
sample of 143 participants.  
Scale scores for some attitudes were computed in the opposite direction to that used in some 
previous analyses.  In many studies focusing on prejudice or discrimination, the scales are 
computed such that higher scores represent more prejudice.  This convention is problematic, 
both because it presumes a normative direction of interpretation when the very focus of the 
research is to understand socially contested normative positions, and because such a 
convention becomes less meaningful when applied to issues such as attitudes to abortion.  
Therefore we have adopted a more consistent convention of scoring all scales such that higher 
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values represent more positive views toward the target.  Thus, higher scores on the attitudes 
to gay men and lesbians scale represent more positive attitudes rather than more 
discriminatory views, and higher scores mean more support for the availability of abortion, 
more support for fundamentalist beliefs, etc.  We believe that this convention is less 
confusing when a range of attitude targets are used, but it does mean that some reported 
relationships will need to be interpreted in the opposite sense when compared with some past 
literature. 
The raw score alpha coefficients for the scales are reported in Table 1.  The reliabilities were 
moderate to high, with the exception of the attitude to abortion scale, which was based on 
only 2 items, and therefore not expected to be high.  As SEM can be vulnerable to deviations 
from normality, some preliminary checks were conducted on the scales.  A visual inspection 
of scale distributions showed that most scales were approximately normally distributed.  A 
small negative skew was found in two scales, the attitude to women scale (zskew = -4.9), and 
the intrinsic scale (zskew = -4.3), but neither of these distributions was considered problematic.  
A more serious concern was the orthodoxy scale, which was quite severely, and 
uncorrectably, skewed (zskew = -14.9), with 74% of respondents scoring at 6 on a 6-point scale, 
and 90% of respondents scoring 5 or higher.  Although this was not surprising given that the 
sample consisted of practicing Christians, correlations with this scale need to be interpreted 
with caution. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
Although the use of pair-wise correlations or skewed variables can create instability under 
some conditions, comparison checks using list-wise deletion of missing data, and transformed 
variables showed only very small differences in the correlation matrix.  Therefore 
untransformed variables and pair-wise computation of correlations were used for the 
following analyses and model fitting. 
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Correlation Analyses 
Religiosity 
The correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2. As expected, the correlations 
among the religious orientation and ideology variables generally followed the pattern found in 
previous studies (Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989). The orthodoxy, fundamentalism and 
intrinsic scales were all moderately correlated.  Quest was negatively related to 
fundamentalism, intrinsic orientation, and orthodoxy.   
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
The extrinsic subscales were not correlated with the intrinsic scale, but did show small 
correlations with each other as well as the fundamentalism and quest scales  
Attitude Scales 
The pattern of correlations among the three group based attitude measures (Aboriginal 
Australians, gay men and lesbians, women) suggested that an underlying group attitude latent 
variable was present.  The abortion measure was moderately correlated with the attitude to 
homosexuality measure, but not with either of the other group measures.  The abortion 
measure clearly shared something with the attitudes to homosexuality measure that was not 
shared with the other group measures, and this finding was explored further in the SEM 
analyses. 
Religiosity and Attitudes 
The correlations among the religious and social attitude scales were also broadly as expected. 
With regard to the group-based measures, higher scores on the intrinsic scale were associated 
with more positive attitudes toward women and Aboriginal Australians, and more negative 
attitudes toward homosexual people.  This pattern is considered in the context of the 
structural models presented below. The extrinsic-personal scale had no significant 
correlations with the social attitude measures.  There was a small, positive correlation 
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between the extrinsic-social scale and the homosexuality measure, such that higher scores on 
the extrinsic-social scale were associated with positive attitudes toward homosexual people.   
Higher scores on the fundamentalism measures were associated with negative attitudes on all 
the group attitude measures.  Quest showed generally the opposite pattern to the 
fundamentalism measures, with high quest scores being associated with low to moderate 
positive attitudes on the group-based measures.  The orthodoxy measure seemed to only have 
a small, negative association with attitudes to homosexual people, but not to the other groups.  
Given the highly skewed distribution of the orthodoxy measure, these results should be 
treated with caution. 
Higher scores on orthodoxy, fundamentalism and intrinsic scales were all associated with 
more negative attitudes toward abortion.  Quest, again following the opposite pattern, is 
associated with positive attitudes toward abortion.  The extrinsic-personal scale again had no 
significant relationship, while the external-social scale showed a small, positive relationship. 
Overall, these patterns of correlation were in line with previous findings, and the abortion 
measure functioned as anticipated.  Abortion was considered as an ideologically legitimate 
target, such that high intrinsic scores were associated with negative attitudes to abortion as 
well as homosexuality compared to positive attitudes toward women and Aboriginal 
Australians.  The abortion measure did not correlate with the other attitude measures in such a 
way as to allow it to be considered a part of the group attitudes factor. 
These patterns form the basis for a series of structural models that replicated and extended the 
findings of McFarland (1989) and Kirkpatrick (1993).  Following the approach of McFarland 
and Kirkpatrick, a model based on a single common group attitudes factor was tested. On the 
basis of this replication model and the pattern of correlations with the abortion measure, a 
second model was tested adding a moral orientation factor.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
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Structural Models 
Single Group Attitudes Models 
The first series of models examined a one-factor solution.  Based on the findings reported 
above, only the group attitude variables were included in the one factor model.  A conceptual 
version of the model is shown in Figure 1.  The base model (Model 1) assumed that the factor 
adequately explained the correlations between the group attitude variables, and that all 
correlations between the religiosity variables and the attitude variables were mediated through 
the group attitudes factor.  The scale of the factor was fixed by setting the variance to 1.  The 
initial model did not fit the data adequately with the single group factor , χ2 (14) = 47.50, 
p<.001, CFI=.92, although the fit indices were in the marginal fit range (see Table 3).  
Although this base model was not a close fit for the data, the solution is instructive.  The 
factor loadings are shown in Table 4.  The correlations between the religiosity variables and 
the group factor, and residual correlations are shown in Table 5.  
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
The group attitudes factor accounted for the correlations among the attitude measures 
themselves, with no significant residual correlations.  The two fundamentalism measures and 
orthodoxy were negatively related to the general group attitudes factor, such that higher 
scores on fundamentalism or orthodoxy were associated with more negative attitudes to the 
groups in general.  The quest measure was positively related to the general group attitudes 
factor, such that higher scores on the quest measure were associated with more positive 
attitudes to the groups in general.  None of the other religiosity variables had significant 
correlations with the general group factor.   
Of particular note is the finding that the intrinsic orientation measure has a non-significant 
relationship with the general group factor, reflecting the fact that it has both positive and 
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negative relationships with the individual group attitude measures.  The intrinsic measure, as 
a result, has the largest residual correlations with the target attitude variables.  After 
accounting for the relationship with the general group attitudes factor, there are significant 
residual positive relationships between the intrinsic measure and attitudes to Aboriginal 
Australians and attitudes to women.  An examination of the residuals and the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test statistics for model modification suggests that the model could be 
improved by allowing the residual paths with the intrinsic measure to be included in the 
model.  This modified model (Model 2) has a significantly better fit to the data, χ2 (12) = 
27.18, n.s., CFI=.97, χ2diff (2) = 20.32, p<.001, (see Table 3 for additional fit indices).   
While this one factor model accounted for the data fairly well, it included a pattern of residual 
correlations that require explanation.  The general pattern was that the fundamentalism 
measures correlated negatively with all of the group attitudes measures, but the intrinsic 
measure correlated positively with some measures and negatively with others as expected.  
The addition of the attitude to abortion measure, and a second latent factor were modelled to 
clarify this relationship. 
Two-Factor Attitude Model 
To test these ideas, we proposed a two-factor model (see Figure 2), in which the group 
attitudes (Aboriginal Australians, women, homosexuality) defined one factor (Group 
Attitudes) while attitudes to homosexuality and abortion defined the second factor (Moral 
Orientation).   
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
In order to define two factors based on only four indicator variables, and allowing for the 
attitude to homosexuality measure to load on both factors, some parameters needed to be 
fixed.  The variances of both factors were fixed at 1, and the unstandardised loadings of the 
indicators of the moral orientation factor were fixed to be equal.  These restrictions were 
sufficient to identify both factors.  The religiosity variables were allowed to correlate with 
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both factors but no residual correlations were included in the model, indicating that all 
correlations between religiosity variables and attitude variables were expected to be 
completely mediated through the group and moral orientation factors.  The two-factor model 
with these parameters (Model 3) was analysed and fitted the data well, χ2 (15) = 16.74, n.s, 
CFI=.996 (see Table 3 for additional fit indices).  The factor loadings are shown in Table 6, 
and the correlations between religiosity variables and the two factors are shown in Table 7. 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
--- Insert Table 7 about here --- 
The two factors in the model completely mediated all correlations between the religiosity 
variables and the attitude variables. The inclusion of the two factors also clarified the 
difference in pattern of relationship between the measures such as fundamentalism, 
orthodoxy, and quest, which had consistent correlations with both factors, compared to the 
intrinsic measure which had opposite sign relationships with the two factors.  For example, 
fundamentalism had a negative relationship with both factors, such that those with high scores 
on the fundamentalism scales held more negative views on the group attitude measures, and 
also on the moral orientation measures.  In the case of attitudes to homosexuality, these two 
negative relationships were additive, such that a high score on fundamentalism was associated 
with strongly negative attitudes to homosexuality.  In contrast, the intrinsic scale had a 
positive relationship with the group attitudes factor, such that high scores on the intrinsic 
scale were associated with more positive views toward the groups, but a negative relationship 
with the moral orientation factor, such that high scores on the intrinsic scale were associated 
with negative views about homosexuality and abortion.  With regard to homosexuality, these 
relationships acted in opposition with a slightly stronger effect for the moral orientation 
factor, such that, higher scores on the intrinsic scale were associated with weak negative 
attitudes to homosexuality. 
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Although the pattern of negative relationships with both factors held for both fundamentalism 
measures, there was a trend such that the Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) version of the 
scale was primarily associated with the moral orientation factor, and the McFarland (1989) 
version of the scale had a more balanced effect on both factors.  To explicitly test whether 
these two scales showed the same overall pattern, an additional model (Model 4) was 
analysed in which the relationships between the two measures and the group factor were fixed 
to be equal, and the relationships between the two measures and the moral orientation factor 
were fixed to be equal.  This model also fit the data well, χ2 (17) = 25.60, n.s., CFI=.95, with 
only a small drop in fit, χ2diff (2) = 8.86, p<.05.  Although this drop in fit was significant, 
neither of the constraints were significant individually, the fit indices still showed very good 
fit, and the CAIC parsimony index showed an improved fit (see Table 3).  On this basis, it 
could be concluded that the two fundamentalism scales, although they captured a slightly 
different approach to measurement of the fundamentalism construct, operated in an equivalent 
manner in predicting the four attitude targets in this study. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although a number of past studies have examined the relationship between religiosity and 
social attitudes to a range of targets, a number of questions have remained neglected in recent 
times.  Our principal goal in the study was to provide a link between these past research 
findings and some more recent complementary approaches.  In particular, earlier studies (e.g., 
McFarland 1989; Kirkpatrick 1993) used four attitude targets and found a broad underlying 
dimension of discrimination, but also some residual relationships associated particularly with 
attitudes to homosexual persons and communists.  These differences, at least with respect to 
attitudes to homosexuality, have been conceptualised in terms of a difference between 
proscribed and legitimate targets of discrimination (Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993; 
Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Hunsberger 1995), the latter explained in terms of a moral 
dimension of judgement (e.g., Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999).  However, models of 
multiple attitude targets have not been updated to recognise this additional dimension, and 
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recent research has focused, instead, on the predictors of attitudes, often using just two 
attitudes, such as ethnocentrism and attitudes to homosexuality, as typical targets (e.g., 
Laythe et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001).  While these studies have modelled 
the relationships among the predictors, they have not attempted to model the similarities and 
differences among the targets. 
Thus, the research reported here provides an important link between these findings.  The use 
of SEM allowed us to model the impact of two underlying dimensions onto which typical 
attitude targets could be mapped, a group attitudes dimension and a moral orientation 
dimension, thus explicitly mapping the proposed explanations for previous findings of both 
similarities and differences in the attitude patterns.  This model is particularly valuable 
because these two factors completely mediate the relationships among all the religiosity 
variables and the attitude targets.  Recent studies (e.g., Laythe et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and 
Kirkpatrick 2001) have used separate multiple regressions with targets that are themselves 
strongly correlated and this causes a number of interpretational difficulties.  In the model 
presented here, the higher-level latent variables are essentially uncorrelated, and thus more 
easily interpreted when regressed onto various predictors.   
The model also provides an alternative and more statistically robust approach to exploring the 
different components of attitudes toward homosexual persons. Disentangling these 
components at the item level to create subscales (e.g., Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; 
LaMar and Kite 1998; Veenvliet and Hunsberger 2003; Wilkinson 2004) has proven difficult, 
as component measures remain strongly correlated. The approach taken here is to disentangle 
these components in terms of the largely independent paths from the higher-order constructs 
to the specific attitudes.  In the case of attitudes to homosexuality, this allows researchers to 
model the overall relationship in terms of the additivity or complementarity of the two 
component paths. 
The value of being able to statistically disentangle these complementary paths can be seen 
particularly in the case of intrinsic orientation.  In this study, intrinsic orientation had a 
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positive pathway to attitudes to homosexuality via the group attitudes factor, and a negative 
pathway via the moral orientation factor.  The resulting zero-order correlation was relatively 
small, and taken alone this might lead to the conclusion that the intrinsic orientation was not a 
good predictor of social attitudes.  The model proposed here suggests that the intrinsic 
orientation may act as an important predictor of each of the components, and that examining 
only the zero-order correlation may not illuminate conceptually important relationships.  
Several studies have pointed to the “Love the sinner, but hate the sin” phenomenon (e.g., 
Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Veenvliet and Hunsberger 2003). The approach taken 
here may provide a better avenue to explicitly test the consequences of holding such an 
ideological position, since this can be explicitly modelled as a positive path through the group 
attitudes factor, supporting civil rights and avoiding discrimination toward persons (“Love the 
sinner”), and a negative path through the moral orientation factor (“hate the sin”).   
In spite of a modest sample size, we are confident of the usefulness of the model presented 
here, mainly because the pattern of correlations on which it is based is reasonably consistent 
with patterns found in a range of other studies in the same domain.  We have no reason to 
think that the model presented here would not also explain similar patterns of relationships in 
these other studies if clearer indicators of the two factors had been present.  Nonetheless, it is 
appropriate to suggest that our model needs to be tested for generality in two ways.   
It will be important to confirm that the two latent variables derived here do emerge in other 
samples, particularly ones varying in degree of commitment and content of belief, and that the 
relationship of religiosity measures with social attitudes is still completely mediated through 
these factors.   We do not make a strong claim about the relative weight of complex paths in 
the model from sample to sample.  In some samples, even attitudes toward dimensionally 
complex targets like homosexual people may be largely dominated by one dimension over the 
other.  We would also expect that the relative emphasis could change over time.  We might 
speculate, for example, that racial attitudes would have had a complex loading on these 
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dimensions in the past, but that the moral dimension is no longer used rhetorically in framing 
racial attitudes for most people.  
The second form of confirmation pertains to the breadth of indicators of the factors.  We 
included four attitude targets in this study largely for pragmatic reasons, but it would be 
appropriate for future studies to include a larger number of attitude targets to confirm the 
stability of the model in variable-space as well as in participant-space. The inclusion of 
additional measures of group attitudes as well as moral attitudes would provide greater 
confidence in the usefulness of the model, as well as in the naming of the latent variables.  It 
will also be important to include a wider range of attitude measures in order to consider other 
higher-level constructs than the two-factor model used here. In any factor analysis, more 
indicators provide greater confidence in the focus as well as the scope of the latent constructs.   
Finally, we note that the two-factor model, as an example of a higher-order analysis of 
attitude structure, may have much in common with other models of hierarchically organised 
structure in symbolic attitudes (see Eagly and Chaiken 1998).  Such models serve to focus our 
attention on the larger social and ideological context in which our attitudes are embedded, and 
we are thereby reminded that the hierarchical structure of the attitudes is a product of the 
larger social and historical context rather than being something fundamental to the attitudes 
themselves.  The two factors explored here may sit between the level of specific attitude 
objects, and the higher-level operation of ideologies, and thus may provide a useful 
clarification of the links between the two levels of analysis.  It may be that ideologies can be 
more clearly distinguished by their different profiles of association with the attitude factors 
we have elaborated here, rather than being lost in the complex patterns of specific attitudes. 
By providing a method for modelling the simple structure underlying complex and contested 
social attitudes, we hope that researchers will be able to focus greater attention on the ways in 
which religious belief and experience continue to frame the parameters of current social and 
political debate. 
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Table 1:  Reliability, means and standard deviations for orientation, attitude 
and belief scales. 
Variable Items Reliability 
(Alpha) 
N Mean 
(SD) 
Religious Orientation and Belief Variables 
Fundamentalism1 6 .81 139  4.10 
(1.21) 
Fundamentalism2 13 .82 141  3.84 
(0.99) 
Quest  11 .63 137  3.44 
(0.76) 
Intrinsic 8 .78 143  4.66 
(0.79) 
External-Social 3 .73 143  3.12 
(1.22) 
External-Personal 3 .66 143  3.61 
(1.22) 
Orthodoxy 5 .84 143  5.67 
(0.75) 
Attitude Variables 
Attitude to Homosexuality 10 .91 137  3.20 
(1.30) 
Attitude to Abortion 2 .40 143  3.82 
(1.49) 
Attitude to Women  11 .74 142  5.03 
(0.69) 
Attitude to Aboriginal 
Australians 
6 .75 142  4.13 
(0.98) 
Notes: 1 McFarland (1989) scale; 2 Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) scale.
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Table 2: Correlations of religiosity and attitude scales 
 Religiosity Scales  Attitude Scales 
Scales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 11 
1. Fundamentalism1 --  .71***  -.61***  .38***  .04  .29**  .40***   -.30**  -.54***  -.23**  -.38*** 
2.  Fundamentalism2  --  -.63***  .41***  -.17  .07  .40***   -.14  -.55***  -.20*  -.50*** 
3. Quest   --  -.27**  .14  -.25**  -.31***   .16  .43***  .23**  .38*** 
4  Intrinsic    --  -.16  -.02  .43***   .20*  -.20*  .20*  -.35*** 
5. Extrinsic-Social     --  .34***  -.16   -.05  .21*  .00  .19* 
6  Extrinsic-Personal      --  .16   -.13  -.10  -.04  .04 
7. Orthodoxy        --   -.00  -.28**  .03  -.26** 
8. Aborig. Aust.         --  .46***  .37***  -.01 
9. Homosexuality          --  .30***  .51*** 
10. Women           --  .15 
11. Abortion            -- 
Notes: 1 McFarland (1989) scale; 2 Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) scale.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 3: Model comparison summary table. 
Model dfmodel χ2model NFI CFI RMSEA CAIC 
1 Single (Group) factor 
model 
14 47.50***  .90  .92  .13 -35.59 
2 Single (Group) factor 
model with residuals. 
12 27.18**  .94  .97  .10 -44.04 
Model change 1 to 2  2 20.32***      
3 Two-factor model 15 16.74  .97  1.0  .03 -72.28 
4 Two-factors with 
constraints 
17 25.60  .95  .98  .06 -75.28 
Model change 3 to 4  2  8.86*     
Note: Good fit is indicated by NFI and CFI close to one, small values of 
RMSEA (close to zero), large negative values for CAIC, and small χ2. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 4: Factor loadings for the baseline one factor model (Model 1). 
Scale Group Factor Residual 
Attitude to 
Homosexuality 
 .83***  .56 
Attitude to Aboriginal 
Australians 
 .54***  .84 
Attitude to Women  .42***  .91 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 5: Correlations of religiosity variables with the inter-group factor, and 
standardised residuals for Model 1. 
  Standardised Residuals 
Scale Group 
Factor 
Att. to 
H’sexuality 
Att. to 
Abor. Aust. 
Att. to 
Women 
Fundamentalism1  -.63***  -.02  .05  .03 
Fundamentalism2  -.60***  -.06  .18*  .05 
Quest  .49***  .03  -.12  .03 
Intrinsic   -.10  -.12  .26**  .24** 
Extrinsic-Social   .18  .06  -.15  -.07 
Extrinsic-Personal   -.13  .01  -.05  .01 
Orthodoxy   -.27**  -.07  .14  .14 
Notes: 1 McFarland (1989) scale; 2 Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) scale  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 6: Factor loadings for the two-factor model (Model 3) 
Scale Group Factor Moral 
Orientation 
Residual 
Attitude to 
Homosexuality 
 .52***  .72***  .40 
Attitude to Aboriginal 
Australians 
 .77***    .64 
Attitude to Women  .48***    .88 
Attitude to Abortion    .65***  .76 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 7: Correlations of religiosity variables with the group and moral orientation 
factors for Model 3. 
Scale Group 
Factor 
Moral 
Orientation 
Fundamentalism1  -.37a***  -.50b*** 
Fundamentalism2  -.18a  -.66b*** 
Quest  .21*  .48*** 
Intrinsic   .30**  -.51*** 
Extrinsic-Social   -.05  .32** 
Extrinsic-Personal   -.17*  -.00 
Orthodoxy    .01  -.40*** 
Note: Correlation between factors is .07, n.s. 
1 McFarland (1989) scale; 2 Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) scale 
a,b In Model 4, these parameters with the same subscript were fixed to be 
equal.   
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
36 
 
 
Figure1:  Religiosity and the single factor model of group attitudes 
Note: Although not explicitly shown to avoid overcrowding the diagram, the 
model includes all inter-correlations between religiosity variables, and 
between religiosity variables and the group attitudes latent variable.  
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Figure 2. Religiosity and two-factor model of attitudes  
Note: Although not explicitly shown to avoid overcrowding the diagram, the 
model includes all inter-correlations between religiosity variables, and 
between religiosity variables and the group attitudes and moral orientation 
latent variables.  
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